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At the very time that professional skepticism concerning the effectiveness of foreign 
aid has reached new heights, donors seem to be ready to substantially increase the 
volume of aid they are willing to make available. This paper attempts to address this 
paradox by first examining the record of aid in the past, distinguishing between cross-
country regressions and select country experience. It subsequently proceeds to 
propose the establishment of a new modus operandi for foreign aid, based on a much 
more passive, bankerlike posture by donors, leaving the initiative for defining what 
reforms are feasible, plus the establishment of self-conditionality, to third world 
recipients before they approach the international community of donors. 
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There has clearly been a revival of interest in foreign aid in recent years. In the wake 
of the Monterrey Consensus (2002), donors have been promising large increases, even 
doubling the volume they are willing to commit. Yet at the same time general 
scepticism about the past record of aid effectiveness has reached all-time highs. How 
do we reconcile this apparent paradox and what can we do to about it? 
The recent increased interest in aid on the part of the major donors can undoubtedly be 
laid in large part at the doorstep of a US post-9/11 push, supported by Gordon 
Brown’s enthusiasm for African development and by the Millennium Development 
Goals campaign of Kofi Annan, Jeff Sachs and Bono. Although terrorists have 
generally been identified as educated and middle class, there is nevertheless a general 
agreement that countries in poverty, à la Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia, are more 
likely to provide a supportive environment. In any case, the US National Security 
Strategy Memorandum of 2002 was quite explicit in calling for a 50 per cent increase 
in aid while simultaneously admitting that ‘development aid has often served to prop 
up failed policies’. Even the hoary OECD aid target of 0.7 per cent of GNP, while not 
endorsed by the US, has been dusted off. And while actual allocations are currently 
falling behind executive branch promises all around, the net result is still likely to 
amount to a substantial increase in rich countries’ willingness to jack up resources for 
foreign assistance—and this at a time of severe budgetary constraints in most donor 
countries. 
During the same period, we have witnessed a plethora of studies fundamentally 
questioning the effectiveness of aid in achieving the professed objectives of achieving 
growth and poverty alleviation in the third world. The 1980s and 1990s era of 
‘structural adjustment’ lending, that is, aid accompanied by conditions enshrining the 
so-called Washington Consensus of reforms, has by now generally been declared a 
failure, not only by academic critics but also by the major donors themselves. On the 
quantitative side of the ledger, aid has often caused a major reduction in domestic 
taxes and private savings. Especially in Sub-Saharan Africa where aid has been large, 
that is, 13 per cent of GDP on average, it seems to have ‘crowded out’, instead of 
‘crowding in’ private investment. On the qualitative side, the inflow of aid has 
frequently been associated with the appearance of the so-called Dutch disease; that is, 
causing an undue strengthening of the exchange rate via an increase in spending on 
non-tradeables and a decline in exportables, especially of the non-traditional 
labour-intensive variety. But even a more damaging problem relates to an extended 
and more virulent strain of the Dutch disease, namely that aid may take the pressure 
off reforms—rather than inducing them—while enhancing a scramble for rents, levels 
of corruption and a reduction in domestic checks and balances. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) have famously tried to dispel the overall gloom by 
claiming that aid still works in the presence of good domestic policies and, later, in 
response to critics, added the need for appropriate institutions to be in place (Burnside 
and Dollar 2004). But the attacks have continued to be relentless, led by Easterly 
(previously at the World Bank), but finding its most devastating crescendo in the 
exhaustive review of much of the cross-country econometrics literature by IMF’s 
Rajan and Subramanian (2005), concluding that aid has had a negligible and at times 
even negative impact on development. 
Among the several reasons usually given for such poor performance is the multiplicity 
of donors, each with its own axe to grind, the lack of nuanced country information at   2
their disposal, the continued politicization of most aid programmes, and, most 
critically, the absence of more than skin-deep real ownership on the part of recipients. 
There are, of course, still staunch defenders of aid, beyond such self-interested groups 
as aid administrators, NGOs and exporters. For example, Steve Radelet and others at 
the Center for Global Development, a Washington think-tank, have suggested that if 
we decompose aid and exempt from consideration both its humanitarian and long-term 
components, we can still find a positive impact on growth. And, of course, there is 
Jeffrey Sachs who argues fervently that aid can and should be usefully tripled, 
essentially by spending large amounts on health, education and the like in pursuit of 
the Millennium Development Goals. Even Easterly, probably aid’s severest critic, has 
no problem in still finding some merit at the micro or project level, for example, 
building schoolhouses or financing de-worming programmes. 
So, the basic question comes down to this: has bitter experience taught us that foreign 
aid—addressed to the recipient country as a whole and using fast-disbursing policy-
based loans as an instrument—cannot work and that donors should be satisfied with 
doing lots of specific identifiable little ‘good things’. That conclusion would, of 
course, fly in the face of a controversy presumably settled many decades ago to the 
effect that it makes little sense to build a better schoolhouse if educational policies 
inside that house continue to be misguided, or for aid to support preventive health if 
the recipient’s budgetary allocations freed up its own resources for a shift to military 
hardware. It should, moreover, not be forgotten that non-project policy-based lending 
has on occasion proven to be a useful instrument at the macro or country level. In the 
1960s and 1970s, that list would include South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, Costa Rica and 
Botswana; more recently, one can cite Poland, Ireland and Slovakia. The reasons for 
not finding more such exceptions probably have more to do with the advent of 
diminishing returns to the ritual dance of the aid process, described below, than with 
the intrinsic demerits of the country programme aid instrument. 
To its credit, the Bush administration seems to have recognized the need to continue 
to view the country as ‘the project’ when, in 2002, it announced the creation of the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), intended to provide more generous 
assistance, but only to countries which have passed sixteen threshold objective ‘good 
behaviour’ criteria. The concept which ‘offers governments the opportunity  …  to 
undertake transformational change by designing their own reform and development 
programmes’ has considerable merit, but the proof of that particular pudding is still in 
its implementation. Unfortunately, we have already witnessed a substantial number of 
country ‘exceptions’, that is, aid to strategic friends which do not necessarily ‘govern 
justly, invest in their people and foster economic freedom’. Shifting the Agency for 
International Development deeper into the Department of State under a new director 
of foreign assistance—while also providing ‘guidance’ to the MCA—is hardly the 
way to depoliticize foreign assistance. 
Other efforts have been made, including those by the international financial 
institutions, to rescue country-wide programming efforts from the ‘structural 
adjustment’ era debacle. High on that list is the ‘poverty reduction support 
programme’ initiative of the World Bank—with its customary mirror image at the 
IMF—intended to correct earlier shortcomings by enhancing the ownership dimension 
of country programmes. But the effort to repair some of the damage by shifting to the 
poverty reduction support programme system, supposedly enhancing local voices and   3
cutting the customary 60 conditions in half, has not really made much difference. The 
IMF and the World Bank have issued large-sized detailed manuals instructing 
recipients how and what to ask for. At a recent Kampala meeting, fifteen African 
countries agreed that the poverty reduction support programmes were simply 
structural adjustment loans wearing somewhat different clothing. 
Unfortunately, fundamental defects in how the foreign aid business is transacted have 
remained. It takes a willingness to act ‘out of the box’ if the fundamental problem is to 
be addressed. Admittedly, foreign aid at the macro or country level has generally 
continued to follow a deteriorating and self-destructive pattern. Donors, acting 
individually or in a World Bank-chaired consultative group setting, usually consult 
with recipients, determine their resource needs, formulate reform programmes plus aid 
level and related conditions precedent set to trigger, usually tranched, fund releases. A 
ritual dance then ensues: early on donors insist that a large number of conditions be 
strictly adhered to, but recipients also know that later, the need to commit and 
disburse will overcome all else; a judgement is then rendered that enough conditions 
have been ‘more or less’ met so that disbursement can follow, if on occasion after 
some delay. Success can then be declared, and next year’s instalment of the ritual 
dance can commence. 
Both parties clearly have an incentive to continue to fashion such relatively superficial 
agreements; and, what is worse, resources which were intended to ease the pain of 
adjustment accompanying stipulated policy change have the very opposite effect by 
taking the pressure off. The result is increasing levels of cynicism and fatigue 
concerning the entire process as the years go by. Donor personnel recognition and 
promotion continue to be tied to commitments and disbursements, not results; and 
recipients enjoy the pursuit of additional rents and the relaxation of fiscal discipline 
made possible by the inflows.   
Is there a way out of the paradox? In my view, fast disbursing, policy-based loans 
remain the chosen instrument for donors to help achieve meaningful reforms in the 
third world. But what is required is a basic change in how the instrument is deployed, 
that is, via the opening of a new assistance window. While ‘business as usual’ country 
programmes will inevitably continue—donors will always have their domestic 
pressures and their pet projects—the new procedure would insist on donors acting 
more like bankers, that is, sitting back and encouraging would-be borrowers to 
approach only if and when they are ready with their own, internally generated, reform 
initiative, complete with self-conditionality. Donors, acting with one voice—either 
that of the consultative group or a UNDP roundtable—would, of course, not be 
expected to sign on the dotted line but the entire relationship would have shifted rather 
fundamentally. There could well result long fallow periods in any given developing 
country case, but commitments, once made, would also be dependable and sensitive to 
the recipient’s political as well as economic constraints. Donors would have to be 
ready to provide aid ballooning over periods long enough to be consistent with the 
adjustment requirements occasioned by the reforms. Given that the profession does 
not have anything close to agreement on what constitutes an ideal generalizable 
development model, traditional donor paternalism makes little sense. Each country 
case will require a nuanced interpretation of what two or three policy actions are both 
desirable and feasible over the next few years in order to remove some binding 
constraints or bottlenecks—not an extensive Washington Consensus checklist. 
Passivity must become the watchword for donors.   4
It is generally agreed that the last time foreign aid worked exceedingly well across the 
board was during the Marshall Plan days in post-Second World War. Conditions were 
admittedly unusually favourable: one donor (the US), high recipient human capability 
and ownership, plus peer review. The current situation is admittedly more difficult but 
not beyond repair. As long as some ‘business as usual’ bilateral country programmes 
can continue, the ‘one voice’ (consultative group) manning the new window should 
not be impossible. The provision of real scope for local initiative in assessing both the 
political and economic constraints which need to be tackled can be assumed to bring 
out local talent which already exists but is commonly underestimated and not ‘in the 
loop’. On the other hand, when a recipient does feel it is still not quite ready to 
prepare a home-grown reform cum self-conditionality package it can be encouraged to 
seek technical assistance. But it is important that such advice be divorced from the 
usual lending agencies and instead be lodged in third party, self-destructing teams, 
preferably financed by foundations or NGOs. Peer reviews, on a regional basis, would 
also be helpful but are not essential at the outset. 
In this fashion the above-described ritual dance would be replaced by occasional 
serious bargaining, vetting both the economic and political dimensions of any reform 
package. Donors would have to commit themselves to respond and supply the new 
window with sufficient resources to make aid ballooning over a multi-year period 
feasible. They would also have to commit themselves to restoring the credibility of the 
exercise by discontinuing support in the case of non-compliance with an agreed-on, if 
now reasonably short, self-conditionality list. 
The obstacles to this proposed new way of doing business should not be 
underestimated. Donors may be most reluctant to reduce supporting ‘their thing’ and 
speak with one voice; the feeding and promotion of aid agency personnel, accustomed 
to a rewards culture tied to commitments and disbursements, will continue to be an 
obstacle. And donor country parliaments, as well as the international financial 
institutions, will have to be willing to give the new window a real chance. Certainly 
the new process could be counted on to disarm those on the left who claim that foreign 
aid is too neo-colonial and those on the right who view it as a ‘bottomless pit’. 
Recipients, for their part, may cynically wonder whether the new window is really 
more than just another donor fad and worry about those implied fallow periods. But, 
when all is said and done, the only reliable way to stop a corrosive ritual dance is to 
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